• Yan Xuetong:The Age of Uneasy Peace 閻學通:不安的和平時代

    Foreign Affairs





    In early October 2018, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence delivered a searing speech at a Washington think tank, enumerating a long list of reproaches against China. From territorial disputes in the South China Sea to alleged Chinese meddling in U.S. elections, Pence accused Beijing of breaking international norms and acting against American interests. The tone was unusually blunt—blunt enough for some to interpret it as a harbinger of a new Cold Warbetween China and the United States.

    2018年10月初,美國副總統邁克·彭斯在華盛頓的一家智庫發表了一次觀點尖銳的演說,他從多方面對中國進行批判。從南海問題到其聲稱的干預美國大選問題,彭斯都批評中國破壞國際規范且傷害了美國利益,其尖銳程度異乎尋常,以至于有人將其視作為中美新冷戰開始的標志。



    Such historical analogies are as popular as they are misleading, but the comparison contains a kernel of truth: the post–Cold War interregnum of U.S. hegemony is over, and bipolarity is set to return, with China playing the role of the junior superpower. The transition will be a tumultuous, perhaps even violent, affair, as China’s rise sets the country on a collision course with the United States over a number of clashing interests. But as Washington slowly retreats from some of its diplomatic and military engagements abroad, Beijing has no clear plan for filling this leadership vacuum and shaping new international norms from the ground up.

    將如今的中美沖突比喻為歷史上曾經發生的冷戰非常流行,其誤導作用也很大。盡管這種比喻有誤導作用,但這種比較還是反映了一個核心性的事實:后冷戰時代形成的美國單極霸權已經終結,隨著中國這個新興超級大國的崛起,兩極格局正在形成。這種轉變將十分曲折,其過程可能十分激烈。中國的崛起可能導致中美關系進入對撞軌道,兩國具有發生諸多利益沖突的風險。雖然華盛頓正在逐漸減少介入國際上的軍事和外交事務,但是北京并未因此提出明確填補美國領導權真空的計劃,且無建立全新國際規范的方案。



    What kind of world order will this bring? Contrary to what more alarmist voices have suggested, a bipolar U.S.-Chinese world will not be a world on the brink of apocalyptic war. This is in large part because China’s ambitions for the coming years are much narrower than many in the Western foreign policy establishment tend to assume. Rather than unseating the United States as the world’s premier superpower, Chinese foreign policy in the coming decade will largely focus on maintaining the conditions necessary for the country’s continued economic growth—a focus that will likely push leaders in Beijing to steer clear of open confrontation with the United States or its primary allies. Instead, the coming bipolarity will be an era of uneasy peace between the two superpowers. Both sides will build up their militaries but remain careful to manage tensions before they boil over into outright conflict. And rather than vie for global supremacy through opposing alliances, Beijing and Washington will largely carry out their competition in the economic and technological realms. At the same time, U.S.-Chinese bipolarity will likely spell the end of sustained multilateralism outside strictly economic realms, as the combination of nationalist populism in the West and China’s commitment to national sovereignty will leave little space for the kind of political integration and norm setting that was once the hallmark of liberal internationalism.

    我們即將面對的是個什么樣的國際秩序?與那些聒噪者的悲觀論調相比,也許事實恰恰相反,中美兩國共同塑造的世界將是一個兩極世界,這個世界不大可能爆發世界大戰。形成這一局面很大程度是因為中國并不懷有西方外交界所認為的巨大野心。中國目前并不覬覦美國世界第一的超級大國地位,因為未來數十年內,中國仍將全力聚焦其維持現有地位的必要條件——保持經濟持續增長。中國為了維持這一態勢將會避免全面對抗美國及其盟友。隨之而來的兩極化時代將是一個夾在中美兩個超級大國之間的時代,一個令人不安的和平時代。處于這樣一個時代,兩方加緊強化軍備,但又小心管控沖突以免陷入直接對抗。雙方不會為了爭奪全球領導地位而結成互相對立的兩大同盟陣營,而是加大投入,在科學技術和經濟領域進行競爭。與此同時,盡管經濟領域除外,中美兩極格局很有可能終結現行多邊主義機制,這是西方民粹主義以及中國強調國家主權兩大因素的共同結果,國際政治一體化的機會很??;建立國際規范曾是自由主義的重要標志,如今建成新規范的機會也不太大。


    WHAT CHINA WANTS

    中國目標

    China’s growing influence on the world stage has as much to do with the United States’ abdication of its global leadership under President Donald Trump as with China’s own economic rise. In material terms, the gap between the two countries has not narrowed by much in recent years: since 2015, China’s GDP growth has slowed to less than seven percent a year, and recent estimates put U.S. growth above the three percent mark. In the same period, the value of the renminbi has decreased by about ten percent against the U.S. dollar, undercutting China’s import capacity and its currency’s global strength. What has changed a great deal, however, is the expectation that the United States will continue to promote—through diplomacy and, if necessary, military power—an international order built for the most part around liberal internationalist principles. Under Trump, the country has broken with this tradition, questioning the value of free trade and embracing a virulent, no-holds-barred nationalism. The Trump administration is modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal, attempting to strong-arm friends and foes alike, and withdrawing from several international accords and institutions. In 2018 alone, it ditched the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the nuclear deal with Iran, and the UN Human Rights Council.
    中國國際影響力在目前的上升,與其說是源自中國自身經濟快速發展,不如說是源自美國主動放棄世界領導權力。就物質層面而言,兩國差距近年并未有實質縮?。?015年以來,中國GDP增長已經不到7%,同時美國經濟增長據估超過3%。在此期間,相對美元而言,人民幣的貶值已經超過10%,這削弱了中國進口能力,同時削弱了人民幣在世界上的力量。盡管如此,此次兩極格局仍然不同以往,因為此次美國反應與過去相比大有不同——美國過去往往通過外交,如有必要,甚至通過武力達到目的——沒有出來維護目前總體基于自由主義基本原則的國際秩序。特朗普治下,美國一反常規,不再珍視自由貿易原則,并且支持某種極端民族主義。在其任內,美國核武器將全面進行現代化改造,美國對其敵人甚至包括盟友采取強硬策略,退出國際協定以及國際機制。就2018年而言,美國已經宣布退出中導條約,伊朗核協定以及聯合國人權組織。


    It is still unclear if this retrenchment is just a momentary lapse—a short-lived aberration from the norm—or a new U.S. foreign policy paradigm that could out-live Trump’s tenure. But the global fallout of Trumpism has already pushed some countries toward China in ways that would have seemed inconceivable a few years ago. Take Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who effectively reversed Japan’s relations with China, from barely hidden hostility to cooperation, during a state visit to Beijing in October 2018, when China and Japan signed over 50 agreements on economic cooperation. Meanwhile, structural factors keep widening the gap between the two global front-runners, China and the United States, and the rest of the world. Already, the two countries’ military spending dwarfs everybody else’s. By 2023, the U.S. defense budget may reach $800 billion, and the Chinese one may exceed $300 billion, whereas no other global power will spend more than $80 billion on its forces. The question, then, is not whether a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order will come to be but what this order will look like.
    就目前而言,尚不清楚美國這一舉動是否出于權宜之計——短暫違反國際規范——還是因為美國新的外交政策范式即將誕生??傊@些變化已經造成諸多影響,并且這些影響極有可能超越特朗普任期。無論如何,特朗普主義已經波及全球,許多國家政策已經開始傾向中國,這在數年之前是不可能的。受到這一因素影響,日本開始大力改善對華關系,2018年10月,日本首相安倍晉三完成對中國的國事訪問,雙方一改完全敵對態勢,開始探討合作議程,簽署50多個合作協議。與此同時,受到結構因素制約,中美兩大全球大國仍在不斷和世界其他國家拉開差距。中美兩國國防開支使得其他國家相形見絀。截至2023年,美國國防預算可能高達8000多億美元,中國軍費則有可能超過3000多億美元,除此之外,沒有任何世界大國軍費會超過800億美元。就此而言,問題不是是否可能形成一個中美兩國主導的世界秩序,而是這種秩序將會表現為何種形式。


    At the top of Beijing’s priorities is a liberal economic order built on free trade. China’s economic transformation over the past decades from an agricultural society to a major global powerhouse—and the world’s second-largest economy—was built on exports. The country has slowly worked its way up the value chain, its exports beginning to compete with those of highly advanced economies. Now as then, these exports are the lifeblood of the Chinese economy: they ensure a consistent trade surplus, and the jobs they create are a vital engine of domestic social stability. There is no indication that this will change in the coming decade. Even amid escalating trade tensions between Beijing and Washington, China’s overall export volume continued to grow in 2018. U.S. tariffs may sting, but they will neither change Beijing’s fundamental incentives nor portend a general turn away from global free trade on its part.
    建立一個支持自由貿易的自由主義經濟秩序將是北京的頭等大事。通過幾十年來的經濟轉型,中國已由農業社會變為全球經濟重地——同時中國已經成為世界第二大經濟體——這一成就得益于中國的出口規模。中國已經逐漸融入世界產業價值鏈上游,其出口產品甚至開始與其它發達國家競爭。無論過去還是現在,出口對于中國經濟發展影響巨大:維持穩定貿易盈余,創造就業機會,這些對于國內社會穩定至關重要。沒有跡象表明這種模式會在未來數十年內發生改變。盡管中美貿易關系緊張,2018年的中國貿易出口總量仍保持了增長。盡管中國經濟可能受到美國關稅的影響,但是這一因素不會改變中國維持現有模式的根本動力,同時不會導致中國脫離世界自由貿易體系。


    Quite to the contrary: because China’s exports are vital to its economic and political success, one should expect Beijing to double down on its attempts to gain and maintain access to foreign markets. This strategic impetus is at the heart of the much-touted Belt and Road Initiative, through which China hopes to develop a vast network of land and sea routes that will connect its export hubs to far-flung markets. As of August 2018, some 70 countries and organizations had signed contracts with China for projects related to the initiative, and this number is set to increase in the coming years. At its 2017 National Congress, the Chinese Communist Party went so far as to enshrine a commitment to the initiative in its constitution—a signal that the party views the infrastructure project as more than a regular foreign policy. China is also willing to further open its domestic markets to foreign goods in exchange for greater access abroad. Just in time for a major trade fair in Shanghai in November 2018—designed to showcase the country’s potential as a destination for foreign goods—China lowered its general tariff from 10.5 percent to 7.8 percent.
    恰恰相反,由于出口經濟地位舉止輕重,它將決定中國未來的經濟和政治成就。因此我們沒有理由懷疑中國努力擴大國際市場份額以及維持市場運行穩定的決心,中國大力提倡的“一帶一路”的重要目的也是為了推動這一目標的實現。中國希望借此建立一個龐大的陸路、海路網絡,將其出口樞紐與遙遠的市場連接起來。截至2018年8月,全球約有70個國家和組織參與“一帶一路”,他們簽署有關項目合同,這一數字預計今后幾年之內仍會有所增加。在2017年的全國代表大會上,中國共產黨甚至將“一帶一路”寫入黨章,這一重要信號表明,基礎設施建設已經遠非常規的外交政策。中國同樣愿意加大國內市場開放力度,以此換取更多的海外貿易市場。2018年11月,中國國際進口博覽會在上海舉行——這一活動旨在展示中國巨大潛力,吸引外國商品進入中國市場。同時,中國關稅從10.5%下調至7.8%。


    Given this enthusiasm for the global economy, the image of a revisionist China that has gained traction in many Western capitals is misleading. Beijing relies on a global network of trade ties, so it is loath to court direct confrontation with the United States. Chinese leaders fear—not without reason—that such a confrontation might cut off its access to U.S. markets and lead U.S. allies to band together against China rather than stay neutral, stripping it of important economic partnerships and valuable diplomatic connections. As a result, caution, not assertiveness or aggressiveness, will be the order of the day in Beijing’s foreign policy in the coming years. Even as it continues to modernize and expand its military, China will carefully avoid pressing issues that might lead to war with the United States, such as those related to the South China Sea, cybersecurity, and the weaponization of space.
    鑒于國際社會對于全球經濟的熱情,許多西方國家認為,中國已經成為一個國際體系中的修正主義國家,這種認識誤導了大眾。中國需要借助全球貿易網絡發展自身經濟,中國無意針對美國進行直接對抗。中國領導層的擔憂不無道理,全面對抗可能切斷中國進入美國市場的渠道,中國希望美國的盟友保持中立,而非聯合起來與華對抗,任何對抗都有可能斷送中國重要經濟伙伴以及來之不易的外交關系。由此可見,未來幾年中國外交政策仍將保持審慎,不會過分武斷或是咄咄逼人。即使中國繼續進行擴軍以及進行軍事武器現代化建設,中國仍將保持小心謹慎,避免觸發包括南海問題、網絡安全以及太空軍事化在內的沖突,因為這些問題可能導致中美開戰。

    NEW RULES?

    新的規則?

    Indeed, much as Chinese leaders hope to be on par with their counterparts in Washington, they worry about the strategic implications of a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order. American leaders balk at the idea of relinquishing their position at the top of the global food chain and will likely go to great lengths to avoid having to accommodate China. Officials in Beijing, in no hurry to become the sole object of Washington’s apprehension and scorn, would much rather see a multipolar world in which other challenges—and challengers—force the United States to cooperate with China.
    誠然,盡管中國領導層方面希望能與美國同行平分秋色,但是他們仍對這種中美兩極秩序的戰略影響持擔憂態度。美方領導人仍不愿放棄全球政治食物鏈的頂端地位,他們極有可能努力制造麻煩,阻礙中國崛起進程。于此同時,中國政府官員并不愿意即刻成為美國唯一戰略標靶,考慮到美方現有的巨大恐懼和蔑視,中國更加愿意看到一個多極世界,在這個世界里,眾多全球挑戰——以及挑戰者們——將會迫使美國對華進行合作。


    In fact, the United States’ own rise in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provides something of a model for how the coming power transition may take place. Because the United Kingdom, the world’s undisputed hegemon at the time, was preoccupied with fending off a challenger in its vicinity—Germany—it did not bother much to contain the rise of a much bigger rival across the pond. China is hoping for a similar dynamic now, and recent history suggests it could indeed play out. In the early months of George W. Bush’s presidency, for instance, relations between Beijing and Washington were souring over regional disputes in the South China Sea, reaching a boiling point when a Chinese air force pilot died in a midair collision with a U.S. surveillance plane in April 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks a few months later, however, Washington came to see China as a useful strategic partner in its global fight against terrorism, and relations improved significantly over the rest of Bush’s two terms.
    實際上,美國在19世紀和 20世紀初期開始崛起,這為權力過渡如何展開提供了某種模式。作為當時毫無爭議的世界霸主,英國一心想要打敗其周邊重要挑戰者——德國——這一態勢使得英國不愿費心且無力遏制大洋彼岸正在崛起的那個潛在對手,它的體量更加龐大。中國現在希望出現類似局面,種種歷史表明,這一局面確實曾經出現,但是已經走到盡頭。例如在小布什上臺最初數月,北京和華盛頓關系因為南海問題而不斷惡化。2001年4月,南海撞機事件使得這一關系達到沸點。然而,數月之后9.11事件爆發,美國開始視中國為全球反恐斗爭中的重要戰略伙伴,在小布什總統的兩個任期之內,兩國關系得到了顯著改善。


    Today, unfortunately, the list of common threats that could force the two countries to cooperate is short. After 17 years of counterterrorism campaigns, the sense of urgency that once surrounded the issue has faded. Climate change is just as unlikely to make the list of top threats anytime soon. The most plausible scenario is that a new global economic crisis in the coming years will push U.S. and Chinese leaders to shelve their disagreements for a moment to avoid economic calamity—but this, too, remains a hypothetical.
    然而不幸的是,如今可以促使中美合作的共同威脅少之又少。經過十七年的全球反恐,圍繞這一問題產生的共同威脅已經不大,促使兩國進行合作的緊迫性已不復存在。氣候變化威脅短期之內仍然無法促使兩國進行合作。未來幾年之內,最有可能促使中美兩國進行合作的場景將是共同應對新一輪的全球經濟危機,這場危機可能迫使中美兩國暫時擱置分歧,避免經濟災難——不過這個機會也僅是個假設。


    To make matters worse, some points of potential conflict are here to stay—chief among them Taiwan. Relations between Beijing and Taipei, already tense, have taken a turn for the worse in recent years. Taiwan’s current government, elected in 2016, has questioned the notion that mainland China and Taiwan form a single country, also known as the “one China” principle. A future government in Taipei might well push for de jure independence. Yet a Taiwanese independence referendum likely constitutes a redline for Beijing and may prompt it to take military action. If the United States were to respond by coming to Taiwan’s aid, a military intervention by Beijing could easily spiral into a full-fledged U.S.-Chinese war. To avoid such a crisis, Beijing is determined to nip any Taiwanese independence aspirations in the bud by political and economic means. As a result, it is likely to continue lobbying third countries to cut off their diplomatic ties with Taipei, an approach it has already taken with several Latin American countries.
    更為糟糕的是,一些潛在沖突熱點仍將繼續存在——其中臺灣問題最為凸顯。本已緊張的兩岸關系近年每況愈下。2016年當選的現任臺灣領導公然質疑大陸臺灣同屬一個中國的觀念,這一觀念也稱 “一中”原則。臺灣地區的未來政府很有可能繼續推動法理臺獨。“獨立公投”很可能就是北京方面最后的紅線,這將迫使北京方面采取軍事行動。如果美國決定援助臺灣,北京的軍事干預就有可能演變成為中美兩國的全面戰爭。為了避免新的危機,北京方面決心通過政治、經濟手段遏制臺灣分裂勢力于萌芽狀態。中國將會繼續敦促其他國家切斷與臺“外交關系”,一些拉美國家已經這樣做了。


    Cautious or not, China set somewhat different emphases in its approach to norms that undergird the international order. In particular, a more powerful China will push for a stronger emphasis on national sovereignty in international law. In recent years, some have interpreted public statements by Chinese leaders in support of globalization as a sign that Beijing seeks to fashion itself as the global liberal order’s new custodian, yet such sweeping interpretations are wishful thinking: China is merely signaling its support for a liberal economic order, not for ever-increasing political integration. Beijing remains fearful of outside interference, particularly relating to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, as well as on matters of press freedom and online regulations. As a result, it views national sovereignty, rather than international responsibilities and norms, as the fundamental principle on which the international order should rest. Even as a new superpower in the coming decade, China will therefore pursue a less interventionist foreign policy than the United States did at the apex of its power. Consider the case of Afghanistan: even though it is an open secret that the United States expects the Chinese military to shoulder some of the burden of maintaining stability there after U.S. troops leave the country, the Chinese government has shown no interest in this idea.
    不管謹慎與否,中國對于支撐當今國際秩序的國際規持有不同看法。隨著國力日益強大,中國將會強化主權原則在國際法中的地位。最近幾年,許多專家在解讀中國領導人的公開聲明時,認為中國試圖將其自身打造成為全球自由秩序的新守護者,他們將此視為中國支持全球化的重要信號。然而這些解讀有些一廂情愿:中國盡管表達其對自由經濟秩序的支持態度,然而這種態度并不包括支持日益增強的政治一體化趨勢。北京仍然擔憂外部勢力的干涉,尤其擔憂這些勢力染指包括香港、臺灣、西藏和新疆在內的地區,指責新聞自由以及網絡規則等問題。在中國看來,國家主權才是國際秩序所應依據的基本原則,而非國際責任或國際規范??梢灶A見,即使未來10年之內,作為一個新興超級大國,中國的外交仍將不太可能采取干涉主義的政策,這與處于權力巔峰時期美國形成反差。以阿富汗為例:美國期望中國在其軍隊撤離之后承擔部分責任,維持阿富汗地區形勢穩定,盡管這已不是什么秘密,但是中國政府對此沒有興趣。


    Increased Chinese clout may also bring attempts to promote a vision of world order that draws on ancient Chinese philosophical traditions and theories of statecraft. One term in particular has been making the rounds in Beijing: wangdao, or “humane authority.” The word represents a view of China as an enlightened, benevolent hegemon whose power and legitimacy derive from its ability to fulfill other countries’ security and economic needs—in exchange for their acquiescence to Chinese leadership.
    中國影響力的持續增強還將可能帶來有關世界秩序觀念方面的變化,例如汲取中國古代的哲學傳統和治國之道。如今“王道”或者“仁政”的概念正在北京流行,這個概念表明了中國人民認為世界領導需要開明、仁慈的觀點,這種領導合法性的源泉正是基于它滿足其它國家安全和經濟需求的能力——其結果是其它國家默認中國為領導。


    BIPOLARITY IN PRACTICE

    兩極趨勢的形成

    Given the long shadow of nuclear escalation, the risk of a direct war between China and the United States will remain minimal, even as military, technological, and economic competition between them intensifies. Efforts on both sides to build ever more effective antimissile shields are unlikely to change this, since neither China nor the United States can improve its antimissile systems to the point of making the country completely impervious to a nuclear counterattack. If anything, the United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty will encourage both sides to build up their nuclear forces and improve their second-strike capabilities, ensuring that neither side will be confident it can launch a nuclear attack on the other without suffering a devastating retaliation. The threat of nuclear war will also keep Chinese tensions with other nuclear-armed powers, such as India, from escalating into outright war.

    考慮到核軍備競賽的長期影響,即使中美之間的軍事、技術和經濟競爭加劇,中美之間發生直接戰爭的風險仍將保持在最低限度。雙方建立更為有效的反導防御系統的努力不太可能改變這一態勢,因為中美兩國無法將其反導彈系統提升到使該國完全不受核報復影響的程度。如果有影響,那就是美國退出《中程核力量條約》將會導致雙方增強核力量以及提高二次打擊能力,這樣反而可以確保任何一方都無信心先發制人打擊之后不會遭受對方毀滅性的報復。核威懾也將使得中國與印度等其他核武大國的緊張關系不至于升級為全面戰爭。


    Proxy wars, however, cannot be ruled out, nor can military skirmishes among lesser states. In fact, the latter are likely to become more frequent, as the two superpowers’ restraint may embolden some smaller states to resolve local conflicts by force. Russia, in particular, may not shy away from war as it tries to regain its superpower status and maintain its influence in eastern Europe and the Middle East. Faced with calls to reform the UN Security Council, fraying powers such as France and the United Kingdom may seek to buttress their claim to permanent membership in the council through military interventions abroad. In the Middle East, meanwhile, the struggle for regional dominance among Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia shows no signs of abating. Across the globe, secessionist conflicts and terrorist attacks will continue to occur, the latter especially if competition between China and the United States reduces their cooperation on counterterrorism measures.

    盡管如此,發生代理戰爭的風險仍然不能排除,較小國家之間的軍事沖突仍然在所難免。事實上,后者極有可能變得更加頻繁,盡管兩個超級大國保持克制可以預防大國戰爭,但是這將使得一些實力較弱國家行動更加激進,它們因此更有可能通過武力解決局部沖突。在這方面俄羅斯的表現最為明顯。由于試圖努力恢復超級大國地位,與此同時保持其在東歐以及中東影響力,俄羅斯也許不會回避使用戰爭手段。面對要求改革聯合國安理會的呼聲,實力正在衰落的英法等國極有可能尋求對外軍事干預,他們通過這種作法支撐他們的安理會常任理事國地位。與此同時,中東地區伊朗、土耳其和沙特阿拉伯爭奪地區主導權的斗爭將會日益激烈。在全球范圍內,中美競爭將會導致兩國反恐領域的合作減少,分裂主義導致的沖突和恐怖襲擊將會有增無減。


    In the economic realm, export-driven economies, such as China, Germany, and Japan, will ensure the survival of a global liberal trade regime built on free-trade agreements and membership in the World Trade Organization—no matter what path the United States takes. On other matters of global governance, however, cooperation is likely to stall. Even if a future U.S. administration led a renewed push toward multilateralism and international norm setting, China’s status as a junior superpower would make it difficult for the United States to sustain the strong leadership that has traditionally spurred such initiatives in the past. Differences in ideology and clashing security interests will prevent Beijing and Washington from leading jointly, but neither will have enough economic or military clout to lead on its own. To the extent that multilateral initiatives persist in such a world, they will be limited to either side’s respective sphere of influence.

    在經濟領域,無論美國未來何去何從,中國、德國、日本等出口導向型經濟體都將努力確?,F行全球自由貿易體制的正常運行,這一體制仍將建立在自由貿易協定以及世貿組織成員國資格的基礎之上。然而一旦涉及全球治理等其他問題,上述國家合作可能就會停滯不前。即使美國政府未來想要重新建立多邊主義國際規范,由于中國已經事實成為超級大國,美國將難以保持和以往一樣的領導地位。意識形態分歧以及安全利益沖突將會阻礙中美兩國聯合領導世界,然而雙方又都不具備獨自領導世界能力。就這點而言,即使多邊主義仍能持續運行,那么它的作用也將限于中美各自的勢力范圍之內。


    China’s emphasis on national sovereignty, together with Western societies’ turn away from globalism, will deal an additional blow to multilateralism. The European Union is already fraying, and a number of European countries have reintroduced border controls. In the coming decade, similar developments will come to pass in other domains. As technological innovation becomes the primary source of wealth, countries will become ever more protective of their intellectual property. Many countries are also tightening control of capital flows as they brace for a global economic slump in the near future. And as concerns over immigration and unemployment threaten to undermine Western governments’ legitimacy, more and more countries will increase visa restrictions for foreign workers.

    中國強調國家主權原則,西方社會背離全球主義,兩者將使多邊主義受挫。歐盟開始變得松散,一些歐洲國家重新實行邊境管制。未來十年,其他領域也將出現類似現象。隨著技術創新成為財富主要來源,各國日益加大知識產權保護力度。許多國家開始收緊針對資本流動的控制,準備應對新一輪的全球經濟衰退的來臨。隨著大眾對于移民以及失業問題的擔憂與日俱增,西方政府的合法性開始削弱,越來越多的國家將會收緊對外來勞工的簽證限制。


    Unlike the order that prevailed during the Cold War, a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order will be shaped by fluid, issue-specific alliances rather than rigid opposing blocs divided along clear ideological lines. Since the immediate risk of a U.S.-Chinese war is vanishingly small, neither side appears willing to build or maintain an extensive—and expensive—network of alliances. China still avoids forming explicit alliances, and the United States regularly complains about free-riding allies. Moreover, neither side is currently able to offer a grand narrative or global vision appealing to large majorities at home, let alone to a large number of states.

    中美兩極格局的國際秩序將與冷戰時期有所不同,世界各國將會根據具體問題在中美兩國間形成靈活的問題性聯盟,這種模式完全不同于按照明確的意識形態劃線的穩固對立集團。由于兩國直接開戰的風險不斷縮小,中美似乎都無意建立龐大聯盟,因為維持這種同盟成本高昂。中國仍不愿建立明確的同盟,美國則不斷抱怨盟友的“搭便車”之舉。此外,目前兩國都無力提供吸引本國大眾的全球愿景,更何況要爭取世界多數國家的認同。


    For some time to come, then, U.S.-Chinese bipolarity will not be an ideologically driven, existential conflict over the fundamental nature of the global order; rather, it will be a competition over consumer markets and technological advantages, playing out in disputes about the norms and rules governing trade, investment, employment, exchange rates, and intellectual property. And rather than form clearly defined military-economic blocs, most states will adopt a two-track foreign policy, siding with the United States on some issues and China on others. Western allies, for instance, are still closely aligned with the United States on traditional security matters inside NATO, and Australia, India, and Japan have supported the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, these states still maintain close trade and investment relations with China, and several of them have sided with Beijing in trying to reform the World Trade Organization.

    由此可見,未來的一段時間內的中美兩極格局不大可能受到意識形態對抗所左右,也不大可能導致有關全球秩序變革的根本性沖突;相反,這場競爭將是一場爭奪消費市場和技術優勢的競爭,這場競爭將表現在有關貿易、投資、就業、匯率以及知識產權的國際規范和規則制定權方面。大多數國家不會形成涇渭分明的軍事或者經濟集團,而是采取雙軌外交政策,在某些問題上站在美國一邊,而在另外一些問題上站在中國一邊。例如,在北約內部,美國的西方盟友與美國保持緊密的同盟關系;澳大利亞、印度和日本將支持美國的印太戰略。與此同時,這些國家將與中國保持著密切貿易和投資往來,其中一些國家甚至會與北京向共同攜手改革世界貿易組織。


    This two-track strategy shows just how far down the road to bipolarity the world has already advanced. And the fundamental driver of this process—the raw economic and military clout on which American and, increasingly, Chinese dominance rests—will further cement Beijing’s and Washington’s status as the two global heavyweights in the coming decade. Whether or not the United States recovers from its Trumpian fever and leads a renewed push for global liberalism is, ultimately, of little consequence to the outcome: opposed in their strategic interests but evenly matched in their power, China and the United States will be unable to challenge each other directly and settle the struggle for supremacy definitively. As during the Cold War, each side’s nuclear warheads will prevent proxy conflicts from easily escalating into a direct confrontation between the two superpowers. More important still, China’s leadership is acutely aware of the benefits its country derives from the status quo, for now—it is chief among the conditions for China’s continued economic and soft-power expansion—and will avoid putting these benefits on the line anytime soon, unless China’s core interests are in the balance. Chinese leaders will therefore work hard to avoid setting off alarm bells in already jittery Western capitals, and their foreign policy in the coming years will reflect this objective. Expect recurring tensions and fierce competition, yes, but not a descent into global chaos.

    這種雙軌戰略表明兩極格局正在形成之中。而這一進程的根本動力——來自美國以及實力日益增長的中國的軍事以及經濟影響——將進一步鞏固中美兩國在未來十年作為世界全球超級大國的地位。無論美國是否能夠從“特朗普熱”中恢復過來,也無論是否能夠重新領導重建自由主義國際秩序,這些因素并不能對當下秩序的形成產生實質性的影響。中美雙方戰略利益是對立的,但是雙方實力處于勢均力敵狀態,雙方皆無把握直接戰勝對方,雙方亦無法決出最終的勝負。和冷戰期時期一樣,雙方的核武器將確保代理人戰爭不會輕易升級為兩個超級大國之間的直接戰爭。更為重要一點是,中國領導層已意識到中國受益于現有的國際地位,就目前而言,這種地位是中國持續經濟增長和軟實力擴張的首要條件之一。就未來而言,短期內中國不會為這些利益攤牌,除非中國的核心利益牽扯其中?;谏鲜鲈?,中國領導人將努力避免為本已緊張不安的西方國家敲響警鐘,因為這些國家的外交政策很有可能對于上述狀況做出反應。我們可以預見,緊張局勢將會反復出現,激烈競爭將會愈演愈烈。盡管激烈競爭將會導致麻煩不斷,但是全球不會輕易陷入混亂。

    Translated by

    Xu Zhou

     (翻譯:徐舟)


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